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Abstract : 
Maruyama Masao （1914―1996） was a major political philosopher and democratic theorist of 
the 20th century in Japan. Main works of him were translated into English, Thought and 
Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics （1963）, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa 
Japan （1974） and so on. Maruyama stayed at UC Berkeley in 1976 and 1983 as a special 
visiting professor. And the Center for Japanese Studies （CJS） at UC Berkeley has opened 
Maruyama Masao Seminar after his coming. Though there have been a vast number of 
studies about Maruyama in Japan, we have to look into the methodology of his study on 
the history of political thought more deeply. Maruyama had built up his methodology un-
der the inﬂuence of European Marxism, Hegelian and Neo-Kantian philosophy, Max Weber 
and Karl Mannheim. Both the study of political thought and the criticism of orthodox 
Marxism were done by his idea, radical democracy and post-Marxism, and his methodolo-
gy. This paper clariﬁes ﬁve points of the study of history of thought in Maruyama. 1. Ten-
sion between liberalism and democracy, 2. Independent and internal logic of development, 3. 
Dynamism, acceptance and modiﬁcation, 4. Multiple dimensions, 5. Various possibilities of 
thought. 
Introduction
　There is a school of the social scientists in Japan that has considered Japanese society 
and its capitalistic economy as exceptional or peculiar. Another traditional school has con-
sidered that Japanese society and its economy had universal features shared with the rest 
of the world. Social scientists in Japan seem to have been schizophrenic on this point. 
They fail to conceive of the relationship between peculiarity and universal in the methodol-
ogy. In addition, sometimes social scientists in Japan have been torn up into theory and 
feeling of the reality.
　Maruyama Masao who was a major political thinker and democratic theorist of the 20th 
century in Japan （Barshay 2004）, had pointed out these methodological divisions in the so-
cial scientists in Japan
1）
. These problems are related to democracy, methodology of the so-
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cial science and Marxism in Japan. 
　Then I would like to focus on three themes that appear in Maruyama’s works. This es-
say is made up of my research notes.
　The ﬁrst of the three themes is on radical democracy in Maruyama. The ﬁrst point 
means his intellectual position in a wide sense. Democracy as permanent revolution is a 
key point in understanding his thought and methodology. 
　The second is his research methodology for the history of thought. This point refers to 
his viewpoint as a researcher of the political thought in Japan.
　The last is Marxism. This third theme is one of the applications of the second theme for 
Maruyama. From the ﬁrst point, radical democracy, Marxism relates to socialism and de-
mocracy for him. Maruyama had been inﬂuenced by Marxist thinking in Japan, but he had 
never been a Marxist. He was a strong critic of Stalinist Marxism. Because of his method-
ology, Marxism was one of his research themes, and it might be said that it was “the ob-
ject of knowledge” （H. Rickert） for him. 
　Naturally, the three themes are connected to each other. What is the proper relation of 
politics to science in a democracy ? Why did Maruyama, as a post-Marxist thinker, pro-
nounce a permanent revolution for democracy ? How did the Maruyama’s methodological 
standpoint apply to Marxism, although he had never been a Marxist. These questions must 
be very interesting
2）3）
.
Figure 1. Framework in this essay on Maruyama
⑴ Democracy as permanent revolution
⑵ Methodology of research of   ⑶ Attitude for Marxism
the history of thought in Japan
１．Radical Democracy as Permanent Revolution
⑴　Liberalism and Democracy
　Maruyama was known as a modernist in the broader sense of that term. A modernist is 
someone who believes in Modernism, who likes modernity and promotes the modernization 
of society. Is it true that Maruyama was a modernist ? What then is the meaning of “radi-
cal” and the spiritual aristocratism in Maruyama’s words ? And how are modernism, mo-
dernity and modernization related together ?
　Modernization of Japanese society had been necessary for the newly ruling class after 
the Meiji Restoration of 1868. There was a dilemma here. The ruling class in Meiji society 
under the Tennou-sei （Japanese emperor system） had to introduce several modern tech-
nologies and institutions of western world, and to improve the productive power of society. 
The institutional changes involved the conversion of people’s minds. But, for the sake of 
uniﬁcation of state and the concentration of power, the ruling class needed to restore the 
old authority of the Tennou and the hierarchical orders under the Japanese emperor. The 
（　　）
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system gave people some measure of freedom, especially in terms of private ownership, 
but it strongly restricted the human rights of the people. The nation state in modern Ja-
pan had to be an authoritarian society by means of traditional discourse. Sovereignty resid-
ed nominally in the Emperor, Tennou, but actually in a small number of higher politicians, 
military groups and high-ranking oﬃcials. Including these groups, the Japanese people must 
be the subjects of Tennou. The nationalism in prewar Japan meant statism, antiforeign 
sentiment and chauvinism. And this system and thought had been widened to the colonial 
empire. But it included ambivalence.
　The process of modernization in Japan had a fundamental contradiction between the au-
thoritarian statism as a strong means of uniting of the nation （＊nation had never meant 
people, because Japanese nation was a subject of Tennou） and producing a strong capital-
ist economy as a social basis and modernity of the society. 
　Several works of Maruyama concentrate on analyzing the structure of mind in prewar 
Japan（“Ultra-nationalism”）. In the literal sense of approving the modernization in general 
of Japanese society, Maruyama had never been a modernist. His thought had never been 
modernism. That is why he strongly rejected the peculiar modernization in prewar Japan. 
After the war he said that his enemy had been the mind structure of Tennou-sei. 
　After World War Ⅱ , Maruyama wrote several papers about modern society in general. 
In 1947, the year in which Japanese society’s democratization was the most important 
problem for the US occupation and Japanese people, Maruyama said that “we have been 
confronting the subject of democratic revolution which had never been accomplished by 
the Meiji Restoration.”（“Shu” vol. 3, p. 161） Furthermore it pressed people to confront with 
the problem of freedom again. He proceeded that those who would shoulder freedom were 
never the citizens whom liberal thinkers （after J. Locke） thought of, but they would be the 
many workers and small farmers in Japan. How were they able to acquire a new con-
sciousness of ethics （in ibid.） For Maruyama, the important thing is the function of mod-
ern intellect and the mind of the people. The function of modern intellect comes down to 
understanding others as others and becoming other in and as oneself （“Gendai ni okeru 
Ningen to Seiji” 1961, in “Shu”, vol. 9, p. 44, cf. Barshay 2004, p. 242―243） 
　Modernism for Maruyama is best understood, therefore, as a reaction to the traditional 
discourse of community and ethos of family. He had never been a modernist, because he 
understood the risks of the modernizing of society. There are two phases in the formation 
of a modern society. First, modernization means the reiﬁcation （becoming impersonal） of 
personal relationships. But, second, it means that people have to make their own social sys-
tem, like an institution, an organization and rules. These consciously man-made things are 
ﬁctions. There has to be an awareness that institutions and rules are man-made, not some 
kind of absolute, and people must always try to prevent a ﬁction from turning into an end 
of itself and to keep ﬁctions relative. The contradiction of modern society exists in the pro-
cess of individualization and substantialization of the organization in our society. When peo-
ple would come to disbelieve the democratic formation of their organization, fascism would 
come to them. It was a myth of the 20th century. （“Nikutai-Bungaku kara Nikutai-Seiji 
（　　）
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made” 1949, in “Shu” vol. 4, “From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics”, in “Thought” ch. 
Ⅷ .） 
　At that time, Maruyama considered all experiences and theories in prewar and wartime 
of the world. He was well aware that the ideologies of liberalism, democracy and socialism 
in the modernization of Japanese society involved traditional patterns, a way of thinking 
and a daily behavior of ordinary people. Since the pre-modern relations of people were 
powerful in Japan, these ideologies tended to have never been mediated with the real way 
of thinking and behavior of people. Modern ideology and traditional ways of thinking coex-
isted with each other. “This is the problem of limit in highly purposeful and selective mod-
ernization. … Modernization implies ambivalent possibilities in a cultural and political do-
main … ” （“Patterns of Individuation”, in English version, 1965, p. 493, in “Shu” vol. 9, p. 382）
　Then, for Maruyama, modernization implies ambivalent possibilities. Modernization cre-
ates liberal relationships among people, but it limited them on the other side. In the sense, 
“nationalism must be rationalized in the same degree that democracy is irrationalized.” 
（“Nationalism in Japan” 1951, in “Shu” vol. 5, p. 75） The quotation means that irrational na-
tionalism must be denounced, and democracy must become usual way of thinking of peo-
ple.
　Furthermore, he noticed that liberalism in the modern world has never been a classical 
one. It is too naïve to believe that formal liberty does correspond to real liberty. Fascism 
which rejected people’s freedom had been brought from formal liberty. Russian Bolshevism 
made a theory of vanguard which meant that a part of social group must lead other peo-
ple. And it is a dilemma that under the name of freedom the liberty is forced to people, 
and the way of life is uniform among people （especially in USA）.
　On the whole, Maruyama noticed the ambivalence of democracy. Liberalism and democ-
racy have a tension between them. Though liberalism is the opposite of statism, elitist lib-
eralism and oligarchy is the opposite of democracy. Democracy tends to produce the dicta-
torship of the majority which means oppression of people’s liberty. Then liberal democratic 
society always has such a tension for Maruyama.
⑵　Dynamism of Being and Doing
　For Maruyama, liberty and democracy are both dynamic processes. That is, being liberal 
is done by doing to be liberal. Democracy is essentially done by doing to be democratized, 
too. The most important thing is that the institutions of liberty and democracy must al-
ways be checked on and criticized by people. People must always be cautious of reiﬁcation 
of the institutions （they take as their highest purpose themselves） and look out for their 
functions.
　Maruyama said that the dynamism of modern spirit has been borne by giving relative 
priority to the logic or value of doing rather than the logic or value of being. It turns the 
realism of concepts to nominalism, and it screens and tests all dogmas. （“Nihon no Shiso”, p. 
156―157, in “Shu” vol. 7, p. 25―26）
　While being or to be is the relationships of the people, like as kinship, race and their so-
（　　）
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cial rank （Mibun）, doing or to do is the role and play of the people. While the former is 
ﬁxed, the latter is moving and it is divided several into parts according of the internal 
functions. The so-called functional groups ― company, political party, union and associa-
tion ― are essentially made by the logic of doing and they characterize the modern society.
　Maruyama’s idea that the being has changed into the doing seems to be the same as 
Max Weber’s. Weber expressed it as the transition from Gemeinschaft （the community） to 
Gesellschaft （the society）. For M. Weber, the community was a native relationship of hu-
man being. And it had changed to the society in which people act and trade with each 
other. So the relationship had been separated to several sides. Those behaviors are evalu-
ated by doing something each other. Being is functional in human culture, especially in 
modern era
4）
.
　But Maruyama’s idea of being and doing and their changing patterns include a special 
meaning. The transition from being to doing was perversed in prewar society in Japan. 
The perversion meant that absolute being subsumed all other being and doings of people. 
That is, for Maruyama, the logic of being and doing was a strong criterion for evaluating 
historical matters. Being refers to situation or state of aﬀairs, such as family’s social stand-
ing （Ie-gara） and their assets （Shisan）. In Japan, the traditional situation had become 
deeply rooted, to be more precise, the situation had been re-established after the Meiji Res-
toration. So that doing of people was separated each other. Though the logic of doing is 
originally a functional diﬀerence, under which the logic of being is strongly subsumed, peo-
ple could not understand the mutual meanings of their doings, they could only do with 
each other in a small and narrow world. He named this phenomenon the octopus pot （“Ta-
kotsubo”） society. Where the voluntary formation of multiple groups and the autonomous 
communication of people has been limited, the social base of discussion and meeting has 
never matured. 
　I guess Maruyama may say that cultural values must be judged by themselves （being）, 
while political and economic values must be judged by these functions （doing）. In Japan, 
however, the value of doings used to be judged by being （not functional）, the value of be-
ing used to be judged by the functional matters. He pointed it was “perversion”. And he 
raised the question by himself whether the conversion of politics into culture means the 
conservative position of him or not, he answered it and ended his assertion as following : 
“The most necessary thing in the intellectual world of modern Japan is that radical intel-
lectual aristocratism should be linked interiorly with a radical democracy” （“Nihon no Shi-
sou” 1959, p. 179, in “Shu” vol. 8, p. 44）.
　Insofar as democracy is an intellectual and spiritual concern, for Maruyama, it is a vital 
“ﬁctions”. Without the eﬀorts of people, democracy would remain a ﬁctitious matter, and 
the reality （situation or being） of society would become an ideological aﬃrmation of the 
established order, and it would kill democracy in its own name. 
　So the word “radical” means a permanent movement （“doings”）. His aristocratism does 
not mean aristocrat. The bearer of aristocratism is not only intellectuals. The broad work-
ing masses including workers and farmers at the core carry the democratic thought for 
（　　）
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their own sake and by themselves as their own spirits
5）
.
⑶　Socialism
　Now, I have to talk about what socialism meant for Maruyama. Though he wrote about 
Marxism as I will discuss later, he never talked much about socialism. From the viewpoint 
of Marxism, socialism was the opposite of capitalism. If capitalism was one of scientiﬁc 
words which speciﬁes the economic basis of modern civil society, socialism must be a 
movement and form of thought that would overcome the capitalist system of society. To 
be sure socialism could be connected with statism and oligarchy, and it then tended to 
produce dictatorship in society. But in its own sense socialism is a negation of the capital-
ist economy. Socialism as a negation of capitalism can be bound with liberalism and democ-
racy as an ideal thought and permanent movement.
　For Maruyama, the relation between democracy and socialism was a pressing issue. The 
issue is how the masses acquire a new normative consciousness of the tension between 
freedom, liberty and democracy. If liberalism and democracy would become a permanent 
revolution, its goal would be the associated society for Maruyama. He said that “socialism 
is a road to enlarge democratization to the inside of production relationship” （1957, in “Shu” 
vol. 6, p. 356
6）
）, and from its meaning democracy is newer than any socialism （1964, in “Shu” 
vol. 9, p. 174）. In my opinion, the associated society including individuation and democratiza-
tion in the individuation is not only any idea of socialist society, but also near of to the 
idea of Marx.
　Maruyama discussed with many thinkers. At a three-man talk in 1966, Maruyama said, 
“Saying sweepingly, the democratic institutions have come to strain the bourgeois system 
of rule. … At that time, the opposite of fascism, the principles of democratic institutions 
which have developed in the womb of bourgeois society would be exerted to the produc-
tion relationship and the management form. This is socialism.” （“Zadan” vol. 6, p. 156.）
　At a meeting in 1965, Maruyama stated that “in the history of thought, socialism was 
born when democracy tried to break its limitation within capitalism, and socialism neces-
sarily relates to democracy, but it could not be said that political democracy would be 
born on the basis of socialism. If we can think there is a diﬀerent level between socialism 
and democracy, the connection of socialism and democracy is best.” （“Zadan” vol. 5, p. 135.）
　When I close this ﬁrst section, I would like to introduce another famous phrase of 
Maruyama ; “As for my own choice in the matter : Rather than opt for the ‘reality’ of the 
empire of Japan, I’ll put my money on the ‘sham’ of postwar democracy.” （“Gendai Seiji no 
Shiso to Kodo”, 1964, p. 585, in “Shu” vol. 9, p. 184）
Figure2 : Three cores of Maruyama’s thought
（vs. Statism）
Liberalism
Democracy　
（vs. Oligarchy）
Socialism　　
（vs. Capitalism）
＊The words in each parenthesis mean the opposite things of three cores.
（　　）
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２．The Method of Research of the History of Thought in Japan ― ﬁve points
　Maruyama specialized in the history of political and social thought. His object of study 
had been several forms of thoughts and their history, especially in Japan. Though he talk-
ed and wrote about his method, his research attitude was that of “jumping into the water”. 
He had never written about the principles for the study of history of thought. It is there-
fore diﬃcult for us to understand his research methodology for the history of thought. And 
he said research methodology for the history of thought must be pluralistic. 
　But I might say that there are ﬁve points of Maruyama’s methodology.
　First, while he might seem to control his passions and desires concerning his sense of 
value, he was fully aware of his standpoint. It was the tension between liberalism and de-
mocracy as I mentioned above. In his research of the history of thought the tension be-
tween liberalism and democracy set the basic tone. A typical example of this was the his-
torical study of Japanese political thought. He extracted the tendency toward liberal 
thought in typical and traditional feudalism of Japan. And he studied the turning from ex-
clusionism to the notion of an equal relationship among nation states. The formation of 
modern intellect in the process of modernization in Japan is the ﬁrst point of his research 
methodology. This point had never changed. 
　The second point is that he studied the development of the independent and internal 
logic of thought. For example, he wrote that the question was how to turn from exclusion-
ism to a modern notion of an equal relationship of nation states within established theory. 
In this sense thought develops an original position independently of the social structure, 
but it is not unrelated to the structure. The development of thought is not simple and has 
several possibilities, for Maruyama. 
　The categories of thinking refer to the given condition when man thinks about concrete 
things. Human thinking and doing have their original and historical conditions. These are 
not only our social environment, but also include the subject （human brain） as the pat-
terns of thinking that have been accumulated in the history. 
　Then, for Maruyama, ideas and thoughts are not a reﬂection of the economic basis of so-
ciety. The problem is to understand the autonomic and internal movement of thought and 
to try to understand it positively as a moment of change in the whole system of society as 
a concrete universal. For Maruyama, there does not exist a relation between economic ba-
sis and its superstructure in terms of a one-to-one meaning. Using this methodology 
Maruyama was able to write his famous essay, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-national-
ism” （1946, in “Shu” vol. 3）. He described the main ideological factors and attempted any 
fundamental analysis of its intellectual structure. He grasped two main principles of “trans-
fer of oppression” and “stunted-ness of power” （irresponsibility of power） in it. Thus he 
explained the origins and features of an ideology and a way of thinking.
　At the same time, Maruyama emphasized that the history of thought is to be understood 
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in the context of social history, and the inner structure of consciousness and the principles 
of the subject of thought can not be understood without the relationship between the sub-
ject and the historical process of society. In short, Maruyama found the key of setting the 
historical context of thought in social history and the peculiar forms of mental develop-
ment. Through setting the mediator, the idea of conditioned thought model, the idea of 
perspectives, between ideas and social basis, he could point out the so-called restriction of 
knowledge by social existence （Karl Mannheim, 1893―1947）. He tried to grasp the dyna-
mism of thought. 
　He wrote that it is a primary theme and the origin of interestingness of research of the 
history of thought to reproduce a past thought through so-called dialectic tension that ex-
ists between the restriction of oneself by history and the reconstruction of a historical ob-
ject by oneself. （1961, “Shu” vol. 9, p. 72）
　The third point concerns the dynamism, acceptance and modiﬁcation of thought. When 
Maruyama considered the modernization of Japanese society, he noticed the close connec-
tion between the lengthways historical change, from traditional to modern, and the cross-
wise contact between the West （including China and Korea） and Japan. The problem is 
how to understand the acceptance and modiﬁcation of thought itself. Maruyama introduced 
to the history of thought perspective, cultural change and cultural contact between diﬀer-
ent countries. He noted, “the introduction to intellectual history of this perspec-
tive …… which includes the problem of translating words, necessarily involves the rejection 
of universalistic theories of historical stages of development.” （1978, “Shu” vol. 10, p. 343, Cf. 
Barshay 2004, p. 234）
　He wrote about the tradition of thought and making use of it. Abstract theories and 
world views came to Japan from foreign countries. Although it is important to research 
their changes from the original when they entered Japan, if we use only the yardstick of 
deviation and degeneration, we will end up with a history of Japanese thought that is a 
history of total distortion and error. Several forms of thought were imported with a highly 
developed awareness. In the very process, the people or thinkers approached the problems 
of their day in their own subjective way. （Cf., 1961, “Shiso-shi no Kangae-kata ni tsuite” in 
“Shu” vol. 9, “An Approach to the History of Thought.” in Asian Cultural Studies 5, p. 14―
15.）
　The fourth point, therefore, is the problem of thought having multiple dimensions. The 
dynamism of thought that Maruyama intended to grasp was the relationship between an 
awareness of the issues facing the times, inner reformation of thought and its inﬂuence on 
real lives.
　The way of thinking and its categories are restricted by the patterns of tradition in a 
nation and its historical period, and they exist under given conditions as the lower level of 
our consciousness and semi-consciousness. Then Maruyama clariﬁed that thought has multi-
ple dimensions. Historical and social conditions, as mentioned above, entered into the sub-
jects as the several patterns of thinking. 
　There are ﬁve levels of ideal forms. ⑴　The so-called “stratosphere”, the most abstract 
（　　）
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and systemized theories and doctrines, ⑵　more comprehensive views and images of the 
world and life, ⑶　the levels of particular opinions and attitudes, ⑷　the feelings, moods 
and sentiments about life, ⑸　under-conscious awareness. （Cf., “Shu” vol. 9, p. 64）
　Maruyama emphasized various dimensions of archaic Japanese consciousness in his later 
years. The words “prototype” “ ancient substrate” and “the basso ostinato” mean what op-
erates in it. Its eﬀect was not to prevent change but to pattern it. In Maruyama, spiritual 
change in Japanese is apprehended in terms of an élan of succession without end, tsugi-
tsugi to nariyuku ikioi in Japanese. （Cf. Barshay 2004, p. 246） He had never changed his 
point of view and his methodology. On the contrary, this study was a result of his re-
search. 
　The ﬁfth, ﬁnal point. Maruyama aimed at various possibilities of thought, derived from 
four points mentioned above.
　He said that there was a stronger inertia in thoughts and ideas than in the institutions 
and organization of society. New ideas and forms of thought sometimes must be dressed in 
old clothes in order to smoothly enter the inside of people’s consciousness. Thought has its 
own origins and characteristics. This means that thought has its own original forms of de-
velopment. A type of thought has to be understood in terms of its ambivalence at the 
starting point. We need to concentrate on the various factors and possibilities of a thought 
which are able to develop in any direction. （1961, “Shu” vol. 9, p. 77）
　In terms of the autonomy, dynamism and multi-dimensionality of thoughts, the last point 
is a natural result. But, the various possibilities of thought do not mean there are no con-
tradictions, ambivalences and conﬂicts among them. 
　Maruyama researched and wrote his works by using these ﬁve points of view. Naturally, 
according to the concrete theme he was treating at any given time, he used one of these 
points in particular.
　As mentioned above, for Maruyama, the function of modern intellect comes down to un-
derstanding others as others and to become others in and as oneself. （1961, “Shu” vol. 9, p. 
44, cf. Barshay 2004, p. 242―243）
　In my own view, this phrase is related to Hegel’s dialectic of Self and Others. In Hegel’s 
logic the dialectic meaning of relation has three dimensions. In the ﬁrst dimension, some-
thing （Self） converts into others. It is alteration. In the second dimension, something op-
poses itself to others. It is an essential relationship. In the third dimension, something be-
comes others, which are not in fact others, it is in itself. Then a particular thing does not 
remain as itself. While it opposes itself to another particular thing, it becomes not only the 
other particular, but also it penetrates the others. In that sense, something or a peculiar 
thing has to be called universality, and particularity equals universality at the same time. 
The dialogue seems to be mysterious, it is true, but it is not only the way of understand-
ing an organic body, like a society, but also the way of development of things for Hegel. 
And it is an important point that something has its own contradiction within itself.
　Maruyama used to use the words of ambivalence, contradiction, dilemma and tension. 
What do these words mean ? They say that thought has no contradiction in logic and 
（　　）
9Radical Democracy and Methodology in post-Marxist Maruyama Masao（KAKUTA）
367
sense. But, for Maruyama, the function of modern intellect has its own multiple conﬂicts.
　Furthermore, modern intellect had been introduced （imported） to Japan in the process 
of the modernization of society. So political and social thought in modern Japan have had 
three dimensions. One is what Maruyama named deep things of consciousness, second are 
the modernist minds, and third are several anti-modern thoughts.
　Maruyama focused on the process of the modernization of consciousness. The most im-
portant thing for Maruyama is how consciousness of independent and free persons as the 
bearers of democracy had been made up in the process of modernization of Japanese soci-
ety. This way is called the internal development of thought. The process necessarily in-
volves several tensions, contradictions and ambivalences.
　When Maruyama considered the process of development of consciousness, he never re-
mained neutral. Because from his viewpoint, democracy as permanent revolution, it was 
important that how the modern intellect had been begun to bud, what is an obstacle of it, 
and to what the modern thought and mind had opposed. Sometimes the thought of a per-
son has two sites. A sort of social thought too.
　In connection to the ambivalence, contradictions of thoughts, I have to raise a question 
of the split into universal and particular. The ambivalence between universal and particular 
is one of the contradictions of thought. What are universal and particular in terms of 
thought ?
　If a kind of thought would assert its universality, all of another thought is particular. 
Maruyama wrote that the identiﬁcation of the “universal” with what is “external” to Japan 
tends to become a sort of particularism in itself. As its reaction the emphasizing the inside 
appears （“Uchi” in Japanese）. It means nativism which would be opposed to universalism 
（1977, “Shu” vol. 10, p. 264―265, cf. Barshay 2004, p. 234）. It had appeared in prewar social 
science that the challenge of Japanese empire against the Western world was the conﬂict 
of particularism versus universalism.
　For Maruyama, the universal does not exist in the external area or any model-country. 
Universal is the feeling and logic in which all of persons, cultures and nations have to be 
seen as same. Universal could be realized to be particular by its own mediation. The par-
ticular has to be mediated by the universal, though Maruyama denied the existence of uni-
versal. For him it seems that all things are individual and particular. 
３．Marxism as an Object of Research of the History of Thought
　What was Marxism for Maruyama, especially in terms of his thought, democracy as per-
manent revolution, and in terms of the methodology of the history of thought in Japan ? 
As mentioned above, Marxism, as one of the forms of thought imported from abroad into 
Japan, had to be an object of research from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge 
for Maruyama. Though he had been strongly inﬂuenced by prewar Marxism, especially 
during his younger period, he could remain a non-Marxist. 
（　　）
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　Maruyama’s reference to the “interesting ambivalence” （1983, “Shu” vol. 10, p. 85） in Japa-
nese Marxism can be applied to the ambivalent relationship between him and Marxism too. 
What is the meaning of ambivalence in this case ?
⑴　The role of Marxism in prewar Japan
　In one of Maruyama’s most famous works, the negation of the Tennou-sei as ideology, he 
taught that Tennou-sei as ideology had been one of his enemies in his own life. It is impor-
tant to note that Tennou-sei ideology had a material power at the mass level. The problem 
was that it could have produced the mobilization, or rationalization, of the “irrational” pri-
mary attachment to family in the service of the state.” （Barshay 2004, p. 217） Marxists 
could not understand how Tennou-sei could “have taken hold of the Japanese people’s 
mode of behavior, way of life, and forms of thinking.”（ibid.） Although Karl Marx wrote 
that if a theory could have taken hold of the mass it has become a material power, Marx-
ism had never come to be so in Japan
7）
.
　We can understand the meaning of Marxism in the Japanese history of thought in 
Maruyama’s “Nihon no Shiso”（1961）.
　First, “Marxist philosophy and the interpretation of history held not only that … econo-
my, law and politics were ineluctably linked, but that even the ﬁelds of literature and art 
had to be seen not in isolation but as linked mutually with them. By pointing out the com-
mon foundation from which the various aspects of the “superstructure” arise, Marxism may 
fairly be deemed the ﬁrst world view （Weltanschauung in German） in modern Japan 
which compelled one intellectually to explicate the transformation of social systems in a to-
tal and coherent fashion.”（Barshay 2004, p. 202）. “Marxism was a grand theory of modern 
idealism, which bore the name of materialism”, Maruyama said that its “methodology pre-
sented a startling freshness of vision as an integrating, systematic science” （1973, “Shu” vol. 
12, p. 85―86） to Japanese who were mired in a precociously overspecialized academism.
　Second, Maruyama recognized that Marxism as communism includes the universal values 
of humanism and democracy. （Cf., 1959, “Shu”vol. 8, p. 33） Marxism clariﬁed the inseparable 
relationship between scholarship and thought. When scientists select something as valuable, 
they use their mental abilities. For Maruyama the most important notion was that true 
radicalism and its essence has the idea of humanity as human beings being the free cre-
ator of society which means that they have the ability to control themselves and their so-
ciety just as they hope. （Cf., 1959, “Shu” vol. 8, p. 157） From these words he noticed one 
aspect of Marxism, the idea of human development.
⑵　Criticism ― Faith in Theory （Riron-Shinkou）
　Maruyama argued that even though Marxism had good points, it also, on the other hand, 
or precisely for that reason, produced some points that needed to be criticized in Japan.
　One of these is the faith in theory. It means fetishism of theory and thought. The fetish-
ism of theory corresponds to the fetishism of institutions in society. Though the essence of 
modern spirit is to create the institutions of society, the institutions in Japan were ready-
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made articles from the western world. Thus their spirit tended to be neglected. As a re-
sult, sometimes theory and concept are confused with reality.
　The theory and duty of the theorist exist in dividing and putting in order the complicat-
ed and various realities from a particular value standard, for Maruyama. The ordered 
knowledge can not only wrap whole realities in itself, but also substitute for the realities. If 
someone would think that his theoretical position essentially could grasp whole realities, 
there would be no limitation of possibility for reality, and from that, on the contrary, theo-
retical irresponsibility for its own theory would appear.
　If scholars were to place absolute trust in the theory, so-called fetishism of theory, it 
would be unavoidable either there would happen a self-consolation of revolution in social 
science, that is a mere revolution in the academic world, or the interpretation of the sacred 
books （for example, Marx’s “Capital”）. （Cf., “Shu” vol. 7, p. 241）
⑶　Universal and Particular
　Thus a split between theory and reality had been developing. The autonomy, dynamism, 
multi-dimensions and multiple possibilities of thought had disappeared in Japanese Marxism. 
And that’s not all ; as a consequence, Japanese Marxism had divided into a kind of particu-
larism and universalism. 
　A Marxist thinker who identiﬁes universal with what is external to Japan, for example 
with the western world or any model-country, tends to emphasize the particularity of Japa-
nese society. They consider Japan as a society alienated from the universal. On the con-
trary, some thinkers considered Japan as a mere representation of the universal, for exam-
ple of monopoly capitalism or something of that sort. They would stand on the perspective 
of universalism. But they can not understand the phenomenological forms of the universal 
in Japan. So the way of appearance of universal is any particularity. Universal arises amid 
historical particularity and also transcend any particularity. 
　Maruyama was a thinker broadly in the Japanese Marxian tradition, the Koza-ha （Lec-
tures Faction） line. He holds the particularist perspective of the Koza-ha. But he held a 
stubborn perspective of universalism by stressing the common formation of free and inde-
pendent persons in modern history. Then he could understand the conditions and limita-
tions of thoughts in the formation of persons in a history of Japan. As Maruyama was an 
outstanding dialectician, he could understand the mediation of the universal and particular.
⑷　Theory and Reality
　Maruyama pointed out that there was a confusion of theory and reality in Marxism. 
　Because of fetishism of theory or a faith in theory, Marxism had never understood the 
reality of politics and society and it had never overcome a faith in actual feeling. From 
that points formulism and schematism had appeared in their way of thinking. As a result 
they neglected the irrational factor in the way of thinking and doing in real politics. 
Maruyama thought that they left an irrational action because of reductionism in theory. 
The closed system and perfectionism of theory sometimes produced terrorism or inhuman 
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action in real politics. It is a practical translation of its theory to real politics. We can ﬁnd 
an example in real politics of history in communist countries and Jacobin democracy as its 
origin. 
　For Maruyama, political process is an accumulation of innumerable determinations. That 
is the second reason why an irrational moment enters in political process. There is a ten-
sion between an individual determination and a knowledge of law in society. An individual 
and personal determination can not be reduced to the universal. If we reduced, a sense of 
responsibility in politics would be deducted. There is a diﬀerent between rationalism and 
pragmatism in the view of science for Maruyama. 
⑸　Anti-Stalinist Way of Thinking
　An essay “A Critique of De-Stalinization” （1956） was one of famous essays of Maruyama. 
（Cf., “Shu” vol. 6, “Thought”, pp. 177―224）.
　Maruyama wrote in the essay that the consistent awareness of issue was to criticize De-
Stalinization “from the point of method of knowledge in politics”. That means he tried to 
clarify the principal problems of Marx-Leninism, especially the so-called liberalization of 
thought. It stands to reason that he considered the problem from the standpoint of his 
methodology as has been mentioned in the second section of this paper. The conclusion of 
Maruyama’s essay was that the truth and historical meaning of Marxism would be in a po-
sition suitable for it on a stage of history of thought only by shaking oﬀ the dictatorship 
and compulsion of truth. 
　This problem exists in the epistemology of politics. Furthermore it must be considered 
under the common basis shared by Marxists and non-Marxists for extracting the common 
issue and political learning of a lesson. Then we have to notice the title of his essay. The 
essay did not try to criticize so-called Stalinism or Stalinist system, but to criticize a way 
of thinking in anti-Stalinist Marxism. Maruyama wrote that the essay would not criticize 
the principles of Marxism and the system of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracy, 
but it could separate out a way of thinking which seemed to exist among communists. 
　The Stalinist and other Marxists tend to consider the system of theory and party spirit 
as closed and perfect. Then they tend to put the minds and political means limited by the 
particular conditions in their world view, and tend to rationalize all of them by the necessi-
ty of political conﬂicts. Their disposition not only obstructed communication with other po-
sitions in scholarship, but also confronted the diﬃculties of self-control of political means. 
Maruyama, therefore, required them to separate out the peculiar logic of politics from their 
world view.
　There was a way of thinking, the so-called base-reductionism in Marxism. Because of it 
Marxists rejected the eﬀort of understanding the personalities of humanity, the way of hu-
man actions and their interaction. So they sometimes explained the reasons of concrete be-
havior of people in tremendously naïve and impractical ways. By a Marxist way of think-
ing, that is the manifestation of the essence, all things are tangible of an inborn and 
inherent one, they are explained by the logic of development of an organic body, and 
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moreover the logic of norms is a way of thinking about natural law. But, for Maruyama, 
by a dialectic way of thinking, the subject （Uchi） is changed by an external （Soto） shock, 
and the outside itself is changed by the movement and action of the inside.
　By a reductionist way of thinking on history, thoughts are explained in one dimension, 
and they develop through a single line. The things that exist multi-dimensionally and are 
mutually determined are arranged by the stages of history that are founded upon the es-
sence. So, an ideology in the following stage essentially absorbs and has passed through a 
previous one. For example, socialism as a form of thought passed through liberalism and 
democracy. 
　In short, Marxist way of thinking had tended to neglect or reject dynamism, multi-di-
mensionality, and the various possibilities of thoughts, including itself, which has been men-
tioned above in the second section of this paper.
　Maruyama wrote that if the occurrence of the Stalin era is expressed in a tragedy it 
would lead us to a moral sentimentalism on the one side and to Machiavellianism in a pop-
ular sense on the other side.
⑹　Hegel and Marx in Maruyama
　Maruyama said many times that he had studied G. W. Hegel and he was inﬂuenced by 
Hegel’s philosophy, especially the reason of history, in his youth just as he was by Marx-
ism. Maruyama explained the reason why he did not become a Marxist. First, his father 
was a journalist who was involved in factual details and did not believe in any grand theo-
ry. Second, Maruyama had studied neo-Kantian thought and empirical rationalism as well 
as Hegelian philosophy. He was unable to accept any social science founded upon a reﬂec-
tionist epistemology. Maruyama had believed in the power of ideas, progressiveness and 
reason in human history derived from Hegel. Then he sympathized with Marxism. But, in 
my viewpoint, one of the reasons why he never went down the road toward Marxism, is 
that he could not ﬁnd the rational foundation of dialectic.
　In Hegel’s philosophy the truth of fact and the idea of practice are identiﬁed. Hegel 
thought he could grasp the whole of history in his encyclopedia （system of philosophy）, 
and the absolute idea is the creator of whole of the world in Hegel’s philosophy. Marx crit-
icized this conversion in Hegel’s system of philosophy. Marx could write his “Capital” and 
drafts for it based on his rational dialectic
8）
. Marx destroyed the fetishism of the typical sys-
tem and construction of concepts in Hegel’s philosophy.
　Maruyama criticized the thought of Hegelian Marxism in which “an analogous conﬂation 
（of fact and value） took place” （Barshay 2004, p. 208）. In my view, Marxist remnants were 
responsible for the conﬂation of fact and value, theory and reality. Though Maruyama talk-
ed about Marxism, he had never written about the original texts of Marx. After Marx’s 
death, his successors had divided into Hegelian Marxists and positivist Marxists. As 
Maruyama wrote, Marxism （Marx’s stand too） is a materialism which dialectically does lift 
（“aufheben” in German） the antagonism between rational and positive, and it is a world 
view which practically （not in meditation） identify the thought of natural law with the 
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thought of romantic. （Cf.,”Shu”vol. 8, p. 123）
　But ﬁnally from the standpoint of methodology, I have to point out that there is one 
great diﬀerence between Hegel-Marx and Maruyama. This is the diﬀerence between the 
substantialist view of concepts in Hegel-Marx and the nominalist idea in Maruyama. （Cf., 
“Shu”vol. 12, p. 46―47.） 
　Maruyama thought that modern spirit turned the substantialist view of concepts to nom-
inalist view. （Cf., “Shu”vol. 8, p. 12） Surely, in the Middle Ages substantialist view of the 
universal was connected with the proof of existence of God, and modern empiricism was 
connected to the nominalism. But in the nominalist view, the universal does not exist, just 
only the individual and separate things exist. The universal is a mere means for explaining 
of phenomena. It exists in recognizing subject （person）. It is understandable that 
Maruyama took a position of nominalism because he stood on modern intellect which 
doubts all of existence. But, as mentioned above, he understood a contradiction or ambiva-
lence between the universal and the particular of things and thoughts. If the universal 
does not exist, he could not say so. In this ﬁnal point, there exists a self-contradictory 
thought in Maruyama
9）
.
　For Hegel and Marx both the individual and the universal exist, and the particular ex-
ists too as a mediator between individual and universal. The universal exists as one of par-
ticulars, especially as Marx clariﬁed. Hegel and Marx thought the concepts are realistic. 
This is a negation of negation in the history of philosophical thought. Hegel overturned the 
philosophical standpoint again.
Conclusion
　As a political thinker and democratic theorist, Maruyama concretized methodology of the 
history of thought by asserting pluralism in method. Though he had been inﬂuenced by 
German idealism, I. Kant, G. W. Hegel and Neo-Kantian, K. Marx, M. Weber, and western 
positivism, he had a uniﬁed personality as a researcher. So it is necessary for us to under-
stand Maruyama’s several methodological resources. But he imagined democracy as a per-
manent revolution in postwar Japan. He carried through his idea, and at the same time 
from his standpoint he pointed out the limits of modern liberalism and socialism. Though 
he could hardly be called a Marxist, and criticized the lack of methodology in Marxism, he 
had always declared openly that he had been inﬂuenced by Marx and he participated in 
discussion with many Marxists. In this sense, from his ideas and methodology, we can say 
that he should be called a post-Marxist and Maruyama’s works must be considered as an 
intellectual heritage of Japan.
Footnotes :
1）　Maruyama Masao （1914―1996） is a great historian and political scientist in Japan. 
2）　I would like to introduce English quotations from Maruyama that will be helpful for this pa-
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per. The “vol.” means the number of volume in “Maruyama Masao Shu” （1996）.
⑴　“ What is seriously short of, and most needful for the intellectual world in modern Japan is 
radical intellectual aristocratism linked interiorly with radical democracy” isn’t it. （from Bar-
shay 2004, p. 226） in “Shu”, vol. 8, p. 44.
　　「現代日本の知的世界に切実に不足し，もっとも要求されるのは，ラディカル（根底的）な精神
的貴族主義がラディカルな民主主義と内面的に結びつくことではないか」（「『である』ことと『す
る』こと」1959年，『日本の思想』1961年，p. 179）
⑵　“The impact of Marxist methodology in the ﬁeld of intellectual history in Japan was in a 
curious way ambivalent.”, Maruyama （1974） p. xxiii. in “Shu”, vol. 12, p. 85.
　　「思想史という領域においてマルクス主義の方法があたえた衝撃は，日本ではきわめて興味深い
両義性（ambivalence）を示した」（『日本政治思想史研究』英語版への序文，1983年）
⑶　“Anyone who has directly passed through Marxism, even if they became post-Marxian, 
could not ignore Marx. It is the same as in the ﬁeld of research called history of thought.”, 
in “Shu”, vol. 10, p. 344.
　　「まともにマルクス主義をかいくぐった者は，マルクス以後派（post-marxist）ではあっても，
マルクス無視派にはなれません。それは思想史という学問領域でも同じことです。」（「思想史の方
法を模索して」1978年）
3）　There have been a vast number of studies about Maruyama in Japan. This paper is not one 
of these studies about Maruyama, and is based only upon my limited notes. It is just a note of 
learning from Maruyama for the author who has specialized in comparative study of methodol-
ogy between G. Hegel, K. Marx, C. Menger, G. Schmoller and M. Weber. See, Kakuta （2008a, b）.
4）　Sociology, for Weber, is a way of understanding human actions by their cultural mind.
5）　He wrote about “civil society”, mass society and the dilemma of “civil society”. But Maruyama 
said, “I never call those people who are alienated from monopoly （capital） citizen. There is no 
substance of citizenship.” “Gendai ni okeru Kakumei no Ronri”, with Sato Noboru, 1961, “Zadan” 
vol. 4, p. 148.
6）　In the English edition of “Thought,” the word “production relationship” （Marxist word） was 
translated to “industrial organization” （modernist word）. （“Thought”, p. 286）
7）　Tosaka Jun who was a famous philosopher in Japanese Marxism and died in prison for an 
ideological oﬀence, said that Marxism had never spread among the masses like “Okesa-bushi”, a 
traditional folk form of music and dancing in Japan.
8）　Cf., Kakuta （2005）.
9）　I criticized a Neo-Kantian’s view of subjective concept in G. Schmoller and M. Weber in Ka-
kuta （2008b）.
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｛追記｝　本稿は2008年度前期，UCバークレー（日本研究センター）留学中に筆者がしたためた草稿をも
とにしている。丸山の死後，彼に関する本は「汗牛充棟の有様」（石田雄）ともいわれているが，管見の
限り，丸山の思想史研究の方法論を掘り下げ，それがスターリン主義もしくはかつての正統派マルクス主
義批判につながることを明確にしたものはない。
　ここではあらためて，バーシェイ教授をはじめ，バーシェイ教授を筆者に紹介してくださった後藤康夫
さんと後藤宣代さん，ならびに関係の方々に厚くお礼を申し上げたい。
　本稿の公刊にあたり，立命館大学「研究成果の国際的発信強化」の支援を得た。また，本研究成果の一
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